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and ROBERT MAY,

WILCOX

Case No. 14820

Appellants,
vs.
DON B. EARLE, BETTY EARLE
and RAINBOW PROPERTIES
CORPORATION, a Gtah corporation,

Res?ondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

ROBERT M. McPJ\E

Attorney for Appellants
Wilcox and May
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

GEORGE E. MANGAN
Attorney fer Plaintiff
Oberhansly
P. O. Box 788
Roosevelt, Utah 84066

REESE C. ANDERSON
Attorney for Respondents
512 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

FILED
MAY - 2 197/
......., _______________________________ ,.____...,..

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State
Library.
Clerk.
Sup..,... Court, Utah
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
cases and Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • i
statement of the Nature of the Case ..•...•..•. l
oisposi ti on in the Lower Court. • . . . . . • . . . . • • • • l
Relief Sought on Appeal. . . . . . . . • • . • . • • . • . • . . . . l
statement of Facts .......•••.....•..•.••.•.... 2
Argument:
Point I ...•.•.•...••...••••..•••••.•••••• 3,4,5,6,7,8
Point II ................•.•...••••..•..•• 8,9,10
Point III ...••...••••••.•••••.••..••..••. 10,11,12
Summary..... • • • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12

•
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page

Prudential Federal Sav. & Ln. Ass'n v. Hartford
Acc. & Ind. Co., 7 Ut2d 366, 325 P.2d 899
( 1958) •.....•...................................

Secondary Sources:
17 Am Jur 2d, Contract, §76 .......................... 4
17 Am Jur 2d, Contract, &398 ......................... 8
2 ALR 643 •..•....•....• · · · •. · · · · · · · · · · · · ............. 10

-i-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellants Dennis Wilcox and Robert May appeal from
the judgement of the District

Court of the Fourth Judicial

District in and for Uintah County which granted these appellants
in equity of $2,040.93 and denied these appellants
an award
,
enforcement of an agreement between the parties to this suit.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A trial on the merits was held on the 24th day of March,
1976 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in

and for Uintah County, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding
and sitting without a jury.

After hearing all the evidence and

having taken the matter under advisement, the court issued a
memorandum decision and subsequently issued finds of fact and conclusions of law holding the agreement ambiguous and ambivalent.
The court further determined that although the agreement was
not enforceable, equitable principles ind1cated that legal relationships had been created and that plaintiffs were entitled to
damages in the amount of $4,040.93.

Upon motion by defendants

the award was reduced to $2,040.93.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants Dennis Wilcox and Robert May seek to have the
lower court's order set aside and to have this court enter an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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T

order upholding the agreement between the parties and h
Old1ng
defendants liable for checks drawn on insufficient funds in

I

accordance with Utah Statutes.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December 6, 1974 plaintiffs and defendants
.
entere'd into
an agreement whereby defendants were to .ou re hase

II

all of the Capital Stock in Basin Distributing Co. for $6, ,Q11:.
000
defendants were given the option to stay in the premises until

I

they decided to move,paying $350.00 per month as rental; defendants were given the option to use a truck so long as they maintained the lease on said truck.

(See Exhibit 5) Exhibit 5 also

indicates that defendants were to purchase all of Basin Distributing inventory at the price of $4, 040. 93.

(TT, 54) Plaintiffs

admitted receiving a $ 500. 00 down payment for the Capital Stock
in Basin Distributing (TT, 53) and all parties admitted that the '
balance on the Capital Stock in Basin Distributing was evidencec
by a promissory note in the amount of $5,500.00.

(SeeExhibitlil,

It was also admitted by all parties that a $ 350. 00 check for
rent from December 6, 1974 to January 6, 1975 was paid, received,
deposited and enured to the benefit of plaintiffs.

(TT, 26)

All parties further admit that a $1500. 00 cash down payment was
made on the inventory.

(TT, 50)

· ·
check
Defendant Betty Earle admitted making and giving a
·
in the amount of $1540.93 to plaintiffs to be applied towards
inventory.

(TT, 23)

. f. d at some

Plaintiff Dennis Wilcox test1 ie

length that this check was presented for collection and was

-2-
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returned unpaid.

(TT, 40-42)

It was further admitted by defen-

at a $1500.00 check with date of January 6, 1975 was
dants th
ayment on inventory and was not honored by the bank
receive d as P
on whic h

l.

t was drawn.

(See Defendant's Answer, R. 6)

Defen-

dants also admitted giving a second $350. 00 check to be applied
as January 6, 1975 rent to plaintiffs and that it, too, was
returned unpaid.

(See Defendant's Answer, R. 6)

There was some question as to when, in fact, defendants
assumed control of Basin Distributing Company.

The Earnest

Money Receipt recites that defendants assumed control on December 6, 197 4.

(See Exhibit 5)

Defendant Don B. Earle testi-

fied that he did not assume control until December 16, 1974.
(TT, 62)

Mr. Earle further testified that he operated Basin

Distributing Company from December 16, 1974 until about two
weeks after February 3, 19 7 5.

(TT, 70 and 76)

It was brought out at trial that neither of the defendants complied with the statutory licensing provisions of the
Utah Code with respect to distributors of alcoholic beverages.

(TT, 101-103)

It was further received into evidence that defen-

dants were aware that there were laws to be complied with but
that they were not fully apprised of their substance;

that plain-

tiff O. B. Oberhansley agreed to maintain his license until such

time as defendants could obtain theirs and, in fact, did so.

ARGUMENT

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE AGREEMENT
A..1':1BIGUOUS AND AMBIVALENT AND IN DECLINING TO
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1
\
The lower court, without stating why, indicates in
its memorandum opinion that the agreement between the parties is ambiguous and ambivalent and that all collateral
agreements are ambivalent, ambiguous and loose.

Apparent-

ly the lower court decided that since there was ambiguity the
contr,act was not enforceable.

The fact that some ambiguity

exists does not in and of itself render a contract unenforceable, and it is appellants' contention that the required amount
of ambiguity was not present in this case.
The general rule is well stated in 17 Am Jur 2d,
Contracts, §76, wherein it states:

The degree of definiteness and certainty
required has been variously stated. It
is said that it must be possible to ascertain the full meaining with reasonable
certainty, or that the obligations of the
parties must be reasonably certain .... The
agreement must be certain and unequivocal
in its essential terms either within itself or by reference to some other agreement or matter .... It has been said that an
agreement to be binding must be sufficient.!Y. definite to enable the court to determine its exact meaning and fix definitely
the legal liability of the parties.
Absolute certainty is not required,
however; only reasonable certainty is necessary. A contract is not subject to the objection that it is indefinite so long as
the parties can tell when it has been performed, and it is enough if, when that time
arrives, there is in existence some standard by which performance can be tested.
(emphasis added)
Applying these standards to the contract in this case,
. d f, ni te that
it becomes clear that this contract is not so in e i

it is unenforceable.

.

pl dif-

The contract provides for seve ··

ferent items of sale: 1) it provides for the sale of a
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distri ·

J

I
\

butorship for the stated price of $6, 000. 00, $500. 00 to be
!laid on December 6, 1974 as a down payment and $500. 00 a month
beginning January 10, 1975 until paid in full with interest
at 7% on the unpaid balance, the monthly payments including the
interest; 2) it provides for the sale of inventory that was to
be counted on December 6, 19 7 4, said sale to be in an amount
different from the $6,000.00 previously mentioned and quite
easily determined by the court to have been $4,040.93; 3) it
provides for a rental option at $350.00 per month should the
buyers wish to remain in the building and further provides that
at the expiration of 8 months the rental would increase if
buyers were still present on the premises; 4) finally it provides that in the event buyers wish to continue the lease on
the truck they, buyers, will pay sellers $1,000.00 and that buyers will assume all obligations after December 6, 1974 and
that any bills already paid will be refunded to sellers.
It is not appellants'contention that the contract is cornpletely clear, but appellants do contend that the contract is
sufficiently clear in its major points that reference to other
facts will clarify the minor problems completely.

For example,

with respect to the rental clause: it was defendants' contention
in their pleading that they did not rent the building per se.
Appellants do not argue that point and defendants' position is
entirely consistent with the contract.

Appellants' contention

in the lower court was not thatdefendants had rented the building
per se, but only that in accordance with the terms of the contract, defendants did,in fact,occupy the building and since they
had occupied, defendants owed rent for the period of their occuoancy ·
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I
not the contract was ambiguous but whether or not defendants

\

had occupied the building for the period of time specified in
appellants' complaint.

If there was any question as t

o whether

or not defendants understood the terms of the rental clause
a cursory look at the evidence admissible to clarify any supposed ambiguity on the part of defendants would clearly indicate
that they knew perfectly well what the clause meant.

They paio

$350.00 rent in December and tendered a bad check in the same
amount in January. Both checks were adrni ttedly for rent.

From

the evidence, therefore, there can be no question that defendants
understood what the clause meant.

Dennis Wilcox testified that

he knew that defendants were present and occupying the building
until March of 1975. (TT,43)

That testimony was uncontradicted

by way of rebuttal or cross-examination even though ample opportunity was avai.la.ble to defendants to do so.
Similarly, with respect to the truck, any ambiguities were
cleared up quite quickly.

The evidence was quite clear in ident:·

fying the truck.

The only question was whether or not

(TT, 44)

I

the defendants had exercised their option to continue leasing
the truck.

No time limit is specified for the exercising of the

option but a reasonable time would certainly be applicable. The
evidence again indicated that for the entire time that the defen·

j

dants owned and operated the Basin Distributing Company they had
use of the truck.

(TT, 4 4)

That testimony

was uncontradicted

and indicated that the defendants used the truck for approxCor·'

imately two months.

With their knowledge that the truck was un •·

a lease ,they knew that payments would have to be made either by
themselves or by plaintiffs.

The question is, once again'
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d.1 d rh'
·

ambiguous.

II

___..........

Each of the other points in the contract was similarly
explainable and the evidence tended to show that each of the
parties knew precisely what was demanded of him by the contract.
The fact that the contract was placed on Earnest Money Receipt
and offer to Purchase is really of no significance.

None of

the parties argued that they did not receive a parcel of land
and it is quite apparent from the document that it was never
intended as a sale of land.

All parties were well informed as

to the items being sold or exchanged.

Although certainly an

awkward method of proceedure such a circumstance without more
does not meet the criteria of ambiguity.
Of significance in this context is the comment of the
judge

in the lower court at the end of the trial and appellants

include this comment with all due respect and deference to the
judge.

THE COURT: You will submit it without argument?
All right.
I ' l l take this matter under advisement.
I would only make
this comment, and probably should not
make it, but it sounds to me as if
something that could have been avoided
just plain wasn't because of negligence,
and perhaps a loss occurred that might
never to have occurred. (sic) Doesn't
appear from my observation of the evidence that there's any dishonesty, any
intent to take advantage of anybody in
any respect.
There was just plain negligence on the part of somebody that
resulted in an unfortunate loss. Because there is no question but what
there is a loss.
Although it is certainly difficult to view negligence and observe a los~ that is not a reason to invalidate a valid contract, rather it is grounds for apportioning responsibility
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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T

I

and allocating damages if any exist based on applicable

duties , I
Therefore, appellants submit to the court that this
i
con tr:.: I
does not meet the criteria for non-enforcement because the
contract was not ambiguous.

POINT II

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION AND
PERFORMANCE TO UPHOLD THE AGREEMENT.

The law dealing with partial performance and partial
failure of consideration is discussed in 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts, § 39 8.

The Utah Supreme Court has agreed with the state·

1

ment in Am Jur 2d as a general principal of law in Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Hartford Acc. and Ind.

f£.:_,

7 Ut. 2d 366, 325 P. 2d 899 ( 1958) .

i

At 325 P. 2d 903 the

general rule of law is stated to be precisely as Am Jur indicawl
The general principle is that failure of consideration is not
a sufficient excuse for non-performance of a promise unless the
failure goes to the essence of the contract.
For purposes of this point, appellants will assume that the:
were required to give "signed agreements with the Beer companies i
to show they have exclusive right to sell in this area."

I

Fur·

thermore, for purposes of this point, appellants wi. 11 a dmit that
they did not give signed agreements.
does not admit that it did

In so admitting, appeiian:

not 9erform the contrac t ·

simply admits that it did not give signed documents to
indicating exclusive rights.

Appellant
defendant',

b::J
I
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L

this such a lack of consideration that defendants are now free
from performing their promises?

The answer to that question

must be no.
The cited authorities indicate that the lack of consideration must go to the heart of the agreement.

If the lack of

consideration is insubstantial, then the defendants cannot decline
to perform.

They may collect damages for the

failur~

but they

must perform their part of the agreement.
In the case at bar,the allegation of the counterclaim
was that the failure to tender to the defendants signed agreements caused the business to fail.

At the trial defendants

tried to prove that this was the case.

There was extensive

treatment of this issue and the court declined to grant defendants counterclaim because there was no showing that defendants
were in any way damaged by the failure of appellants to tender
the signed agreements.

(TT, 70-80).

At the termination of

this long discourse between counsel and the court and the
questions of evidence, the court stated:

Well, I've got to have in order to hold for
the defendant, it seems, on its Counterclaim
it seems to me that I have to have some kind
of evidence that the sellers here did not perform their bargain or did not deliver what they
were required to deliver and that the failure
or delivery resulted in damage to the defendant. (TT, 80)
Such evidence was not forthcoming,in spite of the fact
that the court allowed defendants four weeks extension to produce witnesses to testify as to the damage caused by the plaintiff•

8

lack of signed agreements.

The burden of oroof was not rret.
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were able to continue operating the business with no d
soever.

amage '<ha:

The fact that Schlitz refused to sell defendants any

Ii
I

more beer was in no way linked to the actions of plaintiffs.
Under these circumstances defendants must perform their prornis,·:
because

they have no excuse for non-performance.

POINT III

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ENFORCING THE
UTAH CODE WITH RESPECT TO CHECKS WRITTEN ON INSUFFICIENT FUNDS.

Under this point appellants will assume, arguendo, that
the failure of plaintiffs to give defendants actual written documents was a failure of consideration.

Even under these cir-

curnstances it was error for the court to not have enforced
against defendants the Utah Statutes

prohibiting the writing

of checks drawn on insufficient funds and providing for the reme·
dies prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint.
In 2 ALR 643 there is an extensive examination of the
severability of contracts and when a contract can be divided
so that failure of consideration in one area of the contract
does not destroy the entire contract.

In effect, the case law

indicates that if the contract is not simply one whole or entire
sale whereby if one part fails all the parts fail, the contract
is severable into its parts and failure of consideration for
.
·th promi·
one part does not release a defendant from complying wi ses

made in other parts of the contract.

points out that one of the tests is:

The ALR discussion

Can the plaintift point

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

to a separate sale pr ice for each i tern?

The article goes on

to indicate that this test does not mean that if one were selling
twenty cars and simply divided the total sale price by twenty
one has arrived at a separate sale price for each i tern.

The test

requires that there not be a total sale price for the entire
"package" but that each item almost be listed separately with
its own price

or that there be almost an entire separate

agreement for each i tern or group of i terns or that in some way
the payment can be apportioned to each i tern.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is quite
clear that the rental agreement is a completely separate item
within the meaning of the rules stated above.

The purchase of

the inventory is also a separate item as is the leas;i.ng of the
truck.

Each item is separate and distinct. None of the items

depend on any of the others to make them a whole contract.
For example, the consideration for the inventory is the inventory itself.

Plaintiffs promised to place the inventory

in the hands of the defendants for the defendants promise to
pay cash for the articles.

Similarly, the consideration for the

rental agreement was the giving up of the building space by
the plaintiff to the defendant.

Finally, the consideration

for the lease clause was the giving of the use of the truck
to the defendants on the assumption that the defendants would
also continue the lease payments.

In each case the consideration

for the clause is a separate and distinct act on the part of
the plaintiff, and in each case a separate and distinct amount
Of money or pure h ase price is applicable to the distinct items.
·
Under these circumstances the writing of checks drawn on
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of Basin Distributing inventory cannot be excused bee'""
contracts were unenforcable.

C\ol

The contracts were enforceable, I

as appellants have demonstrated under previous points of thls
brief.

Furthermore under the discussion of this point, even

if the lack of signed agreements is a lack of

considerati~

for a part of this contract, it is not a sufficient lack of
consideration as to eradicate the defendants promises under
other provisions of the contract because the contract was seve:·
able.
Defendants admitted in their answer that the checks on
January 6, 1975 had been written and returned by the banks
marked "refer to maker."

The banks notified defendants of

these two checks and defendants failed to comply with the
statutory proceedure to cure the defect in a timely manner
and, indeed, continue to refuse to do so.

Under these circum· '

stances, plaintiffs should have been awarded damages for these
checks and reasonable attorney's fees.

SUMMARY

The agreement which is at issue in this case was an enforceable agreement.

Defendants did not perform under the

agreement as they promised and plaintiffs, in being damaged
thereby, should have received judgement as prayed for in their
complaint.
DATED this 30th day of April, 1977.
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-Robert M. McRae
Attorney for Ap9ellants
370 East 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to Mr. Reese C. Anderson,
Attorney for Respondent, 512 East Second South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84102 and to Mr.

George E. Mangan, Attorney for Plain-

tiff O. B. Oberhansley, P. O. Box 788, Roosevelt, Utah 84066,

on this the

_;;J. ,J:,_
~

fM "-IL

day of~', 1977.
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